Most of my research uses microeconomics and game theory to investigate questions in public & political economics, industrial & health economics and contest theory. It aims to deepen our understanding of economic institutions, which are defined as a set of rules that determine economic interactions, and to investigate the effectiveness of institutions in solving the underlying economic problems.

The questions that I have explored encompass a wide range of applications that are of substantial economic importance, including:

  • Modern slavery — What and how can economics contribute to our understanding of this phenomenon (see my research project BA/Leverhulme SRG18R1-180545)?
  • Overtreatment and rising health care costs — How should payments to physicians be designed in order to provide incentives to make an appropriate diagnosis?
  • Selective reporting of clinical trial results — How should the environment in which pharmaceutical companies undertake clinical trials be designed in order to improve clinical knowledge?
  • Campaign finance reform — What are the implications of the fact that interest groups provide both contributions and policy advice to politicians?
  • Social acceptance of affirmative action policies — Given that some affirmative action policies lack social acceptance because they are thought to weaken competition, are there affirmative action policies that actually strengthen competition?

On this web site I organize my research broadly in three categories public & political economics, industrial & health economics, and contest theory. Under the research item in the menu above you find my research papers organized by these three fields. (Notice that papers might appear in several fields. For a list of publications without double count click the publications item or look at my CV.) For recent unpublished papers click on unpublished in the menu above. You can also search a list of keywords that are linked to my papers.