with J Alcalde, CeDEx Discussion Paper 2016-03
2nd revise and resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior
Click here for longer summary.
Reverse auctions are considered a fast and inexpensive price discovery tool to award procurement contracts and it is often desirable to award contracts to more than one supplier. Continue reading
CeDEx Discussion Paper 2017-01
R&Red at International Journal of Industrial Organization
Click here for the latest version of the paper.
This paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all-pay auctions when players differ in ability. Continue reading
with P Esteve-González, CeDEx discussion paper 2014-08
Forthcoming at Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
The most recent version is here: DahmEsteveExtraPrizes (June 2016).
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, DOI
We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, DOI
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants’ efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Journal of Public Economics, 2010, DOI
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Economic Theory, 2010, DOI
In the literature, the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions (CSFs). Continue reading