with J Alcalde
The most recent version is here: SSRN Working Paper No. 3572009 (April 2020).
Procurement programs often aim to rely on a diverse pool of suppliers, besides achieving cost effectiveness. We propose complementing a share auction for dual sourcing with affirmative action to create an endogenous set-aside for a high-cost supplier. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: DualSourcingR3 (February 2019).
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International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: SemiTargetedAllPay (September 2018).
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This paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all-pay auctions when players differ in ability. Continue reading
with P Esteve-González, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2018, DOI
The most recent version is here: DahmEsteveExtraPrizes (June 2016).
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, DOI
We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, DOI
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants’ efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Journal of Public Economics, 2010, DOI
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Economic Theory, 2010, DOI
In the literature, the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions (CSFs). Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Public Choice, 2008, DOI
We examine the effects of providing more accurate information to a political decision-maker lobbied by competing interests. Continue reading
with J. Alcalde, Review of Economic Design, 2007, DOI
We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. Continue reading
