with A Glazer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, DOI
The most recent version is here: DahmGlazerCarrotStick (June 2015).
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This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. Continue reading
with R Dur and A Glazer, Public Choice, 2014, DOI
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Journal of Public Economics, 2010, DOI
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. Continue reading
International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, DOI
We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008, DOI
Because campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation cannot effectively prevent campaign contributions to “buy favors,” this article Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, DOI
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Public Choice, 2008, DOI
We examine the effects of providing more accurate information to a political decision-maker lobbied by competing interests. Continue reading