International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: SemiTargetedAllPay (September 2018).
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This paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all-pay auctions when players differ in ability. Continue reading
with P Esteve-González, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2018, DOI
The most recent version is here: DahmEsteveExtraPrizes (June 2016).
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Continue reading
with R Dur and A Glazer, Public Choice, 2014, DOI
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, DOI
We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, DOI
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants’ efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, International Game Theory Review, 2011, DOI
Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Journal of Public Economics, 2010, DOI
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. Continue reading