with R Dur and A Glazer, Public Choice, 2014, DOI
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. Continue reading
with R Dur and A Glazer, Public Choice, 2014, DOI
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, DOI
We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, DOI
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants’ efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, International Game Theory Review, 2011, DOI
Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the complete information first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Journal of Public Economics, 2010, DOI
We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. Continue reading
International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, DOI
We consider a population of agents distributed on the unit interval. Agents form jurisdictions in order to provide a public facility and share its costs equally. Continue reading
with L Corchón, Economic Theory, 2010, DOI
In the literature, the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions (CSFs). Continue reading
with P González and N Porteiro, Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes Research, 2010, DOI
with P González and N Porteiro, Journal of Health Economics, 2009, DOI
Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008, DOI
Because campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation cannot effectively prevent campaign contributions to “buy favors,” this article Continue reading