credibility
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting
with A Glazer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, DOI
The most recent version is here: DahmGlazerCarrotStick (June 2015).
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This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. Continue reading
The Enforcement of Mandatory Disclosure Rules
with P González and N Porteiro, Journal of Public Economics, 2018, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: DahmEtAlEnforcementDisclosure (August 2018).
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This paper examines the incentives of firms to invest in information about product risk and to disclose its findings. Continue reading
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
with R Dur and A Glazer, Public Choice, 2014, DOI
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. Continue reading
Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit
with L Corchón, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, DOI
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants’ efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. Continue reading
