with N Porteiro, Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, DOI
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, DOI
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. Continue reading
with N Porteiro, Public Choice, 2008, DOI
We examine the effects of providing more accurate information to a political decision-maker lobbied by competing interests. Continue reading
with J. Alcalde, Review of Economic Design, 2007, DOI
We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. Continue reading
with K. Cechlárová and V. Lacko, Journal of Global Optimization, 2001, DOI
This paper studies efficient and stable country configurations in a simple model of country formation. Continue reading