with F. Albornoz, L. Frones, and T. Landman
The most recent unpublished version is here: Slavery_and_Trade (March 2021). (This is part of my BA/Leverhulme Small Research Grants SRG18R1-180545.)
with J Alcalde, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2024
The paper is open access: DOI.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to rely on a diverse pool of suppliers, besides achieving cost effectiveness. Common wisdom, however, holds that these two aims are in conflict.
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with A Glazer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, DOI
The most recent version is here: DahmGlazerCarrotStick (June 2015).
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This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. Continue reading
with H Bester, Economic Journal, 2018, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: Credence_EJ_forthcoming (November 2016).
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with P González and N Porteiro, Journal of Public Economics, 2018, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: DahmEtAlEnforcementDisclosure (August 2018).
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This paper examines the incentives of firms to invest in information about product risk and to disclose its findings. Continue reading
with J Alcalde, Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: DualSourcingR3 (February 2019).
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International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018, DOI
The most recent unpublished version is here: SemiTargetedAllPay (September 2018).
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This paper studies the effects of a specific affirmative action policy in complete information all-pay auctions when players differ in ability. Continue reading
with P Esteve-González, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2018, DOI
The most recent version is here: DahmEsteveExtraPrizes (June 2016).
Some affirmative action policies establish that a set of disadvantaged competitors has access to an extra prize. We analyse the effects of creating an extra prize by reducing the prize in the main competition. Continue reading
Matthias Dahm's web site 